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Summary: Impaired interethnic relations in the Western Balkan countries  
and the absence of multicultural policies proved to be major obstacles to  
stability,  security  and democracy in the 1990s.  In  attempting to  identify 
what the security implications for enlargement are, the author argues that  
the EU should develop specific policies towards countries with a higher risk  
of ethnic tensions (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina) than those with no apparent  
potential  for  conflicts  to  re-emerge  (e.g.  Croatia).  Further  on,  having 
claimed  that  the  unresolved  status  of  Kosovo  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina  
might  have an impact  on stability in  the region, the author argues that,  
despite  the EU’s  advocacy of  an individual approach towards applicant  
states, the Union’s relations with the Western Balkans will probably remain  
characterised by a more regional approach, in terms both of commonly-
used  patterns  of  accession  (applying  the  same  criteria  and  assessing  
achievements  via  the  Stabilization  and  Association  Process)  and  of  the 
EU’s  insistence  on  regional  cooperation. The  necessity  of  regional  
cooperation  in  the  Western  Balkans  is  emphasised,  and  the  political,  
economic and social problems common to all countries in the region are 
highlighted.  Finally,  the  author  concludes  that  the  EU’s  insistence  on  
regional  cooperation  in  the  region should  be  viewed as  an  incentive to  
addressing  cross-boundary  issues,  and  not  as  a  threat  that  individual  
accession could be obstructed.
Introduction and Basic Hypotheses
Any kind of cooperation between states should enhance the security and 
stability among them. The example of the European Union (hereinafter: EU) 
is  often  pointed  out  as  an  undertaking  that  maintains  peace  among  its 
member states.1 The unification of Europe will not be complete until the EU 
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includes the region of the Western Balkans2, affected in the recent past by 
interethnic conflicts. Moreover, the prospective enlargement of the EU into 
the Western Balkans is perceived as the EU's contribution to security and 
stability in the region. Apart from playing a role in ending ethnic conflicts in 
the Balkans, the EU (together with other international organisations) still 
assures internal security in two Western Balkan countries in which NATO 
troops have been deployed (Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Province of 
Kosovo of Serbia and Montenegro).3 Furthermore, it is very likely that the 
candidate  status  recently  granted to  one  of  the  region’s  countries  would 
bring stability not only to the country itself but also to the broader region. In 
addition, reconstruction and state building are mostly financed by the EU 
countries.4 The prospect is that it will  become a development instrument, 
since the hope of accession has enhanced democratisation policies in the 
countries of the region, and has contributed to the undertaking of necessary 
transformations in domestic policies.5 
2 For the purposes of this paper, the Western Balkans refers to the region comprising the 
five  Southeastern  European countries  involved  in  the  EU Stabilisation  and Association 
Process: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  
3 Ethnic conflict contributed to redefining the relationship between the EU and the US. 
Only  then  did  the  EU  start  to  design  its  own  common  foreign  and  security  policy, 
independently  of  NATO.  For  example,  80%  of  approximately  50,000  NATO  soldiers 
deployed  in  the  Balkans  are  members  of  European  armies.  See  Sophia  Clement,  The 
Balkans  and  Beyond:  the  European  Perspective  on  Future  Regional  Stability, East 
European  Studies/West  European  Studies  p.  65-69,  http://wwics.si.edu/ees/special/ 
2000/clemen.pdf.  The  first  European  Union  Police  Mission  (EUMP)  was  launched  in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003, taking over a task previously executed by the 
United Nation’s International Police task Force (IPTF) and establishing for the first time a 
uniform  EU  police  force.  See  also  Adam  Daniel  Rotfeld  (Ed.),  The  New  Security  
Dimensions  in  Europe  after  the  NATO  and  EU  Enlargements  (2001)  Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute.
4 The EU countries provide the largest part of the financial assistance for development and 
reconstruction  projects.  See  Economic  Reconstruction  and  Development  in  South  East  
Europe , http://www.seerecon.org/
5 Vladimir Gligorov, Mario Holzner, Michael Landesmann, Prospects for Further (South)  
Eastern EU Enlargement: from Divergence to Convergence? (2003) 296 Research Report 
of the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.  See also Samuel Huntington, 
THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ( 1991) Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press. See also Othon Anastasakis,  EU Democracy Building in South-Eastern  
Europe:  Is  There  a  Contribution  to  the  Democratisation  Process?, 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies/events/confenlarg/ana.pdf.  See  also Leeda  Demetropoulou, 
Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU Involvement and Europeanization 
Capacity in South Eastern Europe (2002) 2-3 Vol. III Southeast European Politics Online, 
p. 87-106
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The Western Balkans is perceived as a region of weak states that still needs 
international support.6 In the past decade all the countries of the region have 
experienced a period of transition and ethnic conflict with a decline in the 
standard  of  living  and  a  slowing  of  economic  growth;  yet  they  have 
achieved different levels of democratisation and are heterogeneous in their 
economic  growth.7 There  are  also  differences  regarding  their  status  and 
“distance”  from  the  Union.  Deteriorating  interethnic  relations  within 
countries and an absence of multicultural policies have proven to be a major 
obstacle for stability, security and democracy in the region. On the basis of 
the  existing  policy  developed  to  encourage  EU  enlargement  into  the 
Western Balkans, this paper argues that the only fair approach the EU could 
have accepted was a differentiated approach towards countries with a higher 
risk  of  ethnic  tensions,  e.g.  Kosovo  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and  those 
countries with low or no potential  for the re-emergence of conflicts (e.g. 
Croatia). The paper will specifically argue that keeping the status of Kosovo 
unresolved, and carrying over an international co-governance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, might have a negative impact on the stability of the region 
that  could  eventually  influence  the  speed  of  accession  of  neighbouring 
countries.
The paper will proceed in three parts. The first part will give a chronological 
overview of the recent EU policies vis-à-vis the Western Balkan states, from 
a humanitarian role at the beginning of the 1990s, through the involvement 
of the states of the region in Community programmes and institutions, to the 
introduction of accession negotiations with one of these countries in 2005. 
The second part of the paper will argue that even though the EU advocates a 
strictly individual approach towards potential applicants, a regional strategy 
will  influence  its  demeanour  in  the  Western  Balkans,  both  through  the 
commonly used patterns for accession, and through the EU’s insistence on 
regional cooperation. The paper will then explore whether some countries 
risk being deprived of accession as a consequence of the security situation 
in  their  neighbouring countries.  Finally,  in  the  third  part,  the  paper  will 
examine the need for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, pointing 
6 Wim  van  Meurs  (Ed.),  PROSPECTS AND RISKS BEYOND EU  ENLARGEMENT,  SOUTHEASTERN 
EUROPE: WEAK STATES AND STRONG INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT (2003) Opladen: Leske & Budrich. 
Laura Silber, Bush Has Neglected the Balkans For Too Long. A ticking time bomb. Article 
in the International Herald Tribune,13 January 2004.
7 World Bank experts point toward poverty, unemployment, social cohesion and inadequate 
governance  as  common  challenges  faced  by  the  region.  See  The  World  Bank  Policy  
Research Working Paper, http://www.wds.worldbank.org/
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out  that  political,  economic  and  social  problems  are  common  to  all 
countries  in  the  region.  For  this  reason,  the  paper  will  argue  that  the 
insistence of the EU on regional cooperation should be interpreted as a call 
from the EU to the Western Balkan countries to address cross-boundary 
issues  jointly,  rather  than  as  an  obstacle  to  individual  accession.  The 
theoretical framework of the paper will apply the postulates of two aspects 
of  liberal  theory  in  international  relations  which  in  general  advocates 
cooperation  among  states  as  a  means  of  pursuing  common  interests. 
Applying  the  hypotheses  of  liberal  internationalism  and  of  neoliberal 
institutionalism, the paper will assert that the regional approach of the EU 
towards  the  Western  Balkans  as  a  region  aims  at  the  creation  of 
transnational economies and the development of cooperation among states, 
by extending EU principles, policies and decision-making procedures. The 
paper will try to prove that regional cooperation and the establishment of free 
trade and economic exchange within the region could serve as a road to 
long-lasting peace, which is the goal of both the EU and the Western Balkan 
states.
 
The European Union’s Initiatives for South East Europe 
Cooperation among the EU and non-member states intensified considerably 
in the 1990s when the European Community opted to develop “contractual” 
relations  with  the  applicant  countries  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe. 
“Europe  Agreements”  were  concluded  with  eight  Central  and  Eastern 
European (CEE) countries8 and “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” 
were signed with ten other countries that emerged from the former Soviet 
Union.9 The Copenhagen Criteria for Central and Eastern European were 
designed in 1993 for countries wishing to join the EU. 10 The EU announced 
that those pre-accession strategies would be eventually applied to all other 
states seeking accession to the EU. According to these criteria, a candidate 
country has to achieve stable democratic institutions, the rule of law, human 
8 Europe Agreements were concluded with Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
9 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements were signed with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
10 The European Union met at Copenhagen, Denmark in June 1993 with the intention of 
deliberating upon the issue of enlargement. Deciding to encourage the enlargement of the 
organisation, the EU agreed that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
that so desire shall  become members of  the European Union after they achieve certain 
prerequisites in both a political and economic sphere. The European Council envisaged that 
the accession would take place as soon as an associated country was able to assume the 
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. 
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rights  and  respect  for  and  protection  of  minorities.  Moreover,  stable 
institutions  are  needed  to  guarantee  the  implementation  of  the  political 
criteria necessary for accession. The economic criteria require the existence 
of a functioning market economy and the capacity to withstand competitive 
pressures and market forces within the EU. The Copenhagen Criteria also 
established the obligation of the candidate country to create the conditions 
for its integration through the adjustment of its administrative structures, so 
that European Community legislation transposed into national legislation is 
implemented  effectively  through  appropriate  administrative  and  judicial 
structures. 
In the early 1990s, the main area of EU involvement in the Western Balkans 
was of a humanitarian nature. The EU adopted a regional approach towards 
Southeastern European countries (hereinafter: SEE), whereby the main aim 
was to achieve basic stability and prosperity for the region as a whole. At 
that  time,  the  region  had been  witnessing  a  chain  of  violent  interethnic 
conflicts,  so  stability  was  obviously  the  minimum  condition  for  further 
cooperation  with  the  EU.  The EU’s  first  initiative  to  stabilise  SEE was 
launched in December 1996. Known as the Royaumont Process, its aim was 
to support the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements.11 In 1997 
the EU was still opting for the regional approach, establishing political and 
economic conditions as a prerequisite for bilateral  relations with the five 
countries of the region. These conditions included respect for democratic 
principles, human rights and the rule of law, minority protection, market 
economy reforms and regional cooperation. In 1999, the EU encouraged 
reforms  in  the  region  which  were  meant  to  serve  as  pre-conditions  for 
accession into the EU. It became apparent that the countries in the region 
needed  to  establish  bilateral  and  multilateral  relationships  among 
themselves,  and  therefore  the  EU  attempted  to  launch  “a  regional 
multilateral tool”12 for the region: the Stability Pact. Launched in 1999, the 
Stability Pact was an initiative that drew together the EU and some other 
partner  states  with  the  aim  of  bringing  peace,  stability  and  economic 
development to the Balkans.13 The Pact has brought about a high degree of 
11 The Royaumont Process originally focused on promoting regional projects in the field of 
civil society, culture and human rights. It now advocates inter-parliamentary relations under 
the Stability Pact.
12 Vesna  Bojicic-Dzelilovic,  Othon  Anastasakis,  Balkan  Regional  Cooperation  and 
European  Integration (2002)  The  Hellenic  Observatory,  LSE,  London, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/   
13 The Stability Pact lays down a framework for cooperation between the European Union, 
the  European  Commission,  the  United  States,  Russia,  Japan,  Southeastern  European 
countries, Turkey and other countries, including regional and international organisations 
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cooperation among the Balkan countries, by promoting self-help aimed at 
ending dependency on donor countries. Chairman Erhard Busek claims that 
the Pact’s accomplishments were more noteworthy “than most people in the 
region  realise:”14 under  the  pact,  twenty-one  free-trade  agreements  were 
concluded  within  the  region.  However,  it  could  not  meet all  the  goals 
required for the stabilisation of the region and a new approach was needed 
in order to address adequately the issues in the Western Balkans.
A cornerstone in the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans after the post-
Kosovo  crisis  was  the  introduction  of  the  Stabilisation  and  Association 
process  (SAp).  This  process  promotes  stability  within  the  region  and 
facilitates a closer association of the Western Balkan countries with the EU, 
and ultimately assists countries in their preparation for EU membership. The 
EU’s General Affairs Council of May 2002 stated that “[t]he speed with 
which each country moves through the different stages of the SAp, taking 
ownership of the process, depends on the increasing ability to take on the 
obligations flowing from an ever closer association with the EU as well as 
compliance with the conditionality policy.”  However, some scholars have 
pointed out that the SAp has not been adequately and “cleverly sold to the 
people in the region as a process leading clearly to accession.”15 In 2000, a 
new EU financial instrument “Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development  and  Stabilisation”  (CARDS)  was  set  up.  The  CARDS 
initiative is a financial instrument used to manage EU assistance to SAp 
countries.16 
The  first  Summit  that  brought  together  EU  officials  and  leaders  of  the 
Western Balkan countries in Zagreb in November 2000 introduced a change 
in  the  EU  approach  towards  the  potential  accession  candidates  of  the 
Western Balkans.  Whilst  formally all  Balkan countries  were accepted as 
potential EU accession candidates, actual candidate status would depend on 
the intended implementation of reforms.17 For that reason, assistance and 
and international financing institutions.
14 Interview with Erhard Busek, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 May 2004.
15 Othon Anastasakis, Dimitar Bechev, EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing 
Commitment to the Process, http://www.cespi.it/ 
16 The allocation of funds by CARDS in 2003 was as follows: € 46.5 million for Albania, € 
63 million for BiH, € 62 million for Croatia, € 38.5 million for FYROM, € 13.5 million for 
Montenegro, € 229 million for Serbia, € 49 million for Kosovo. See http://europa.eu.int/ 
17 The Declaration of the Zagreb Summit of European Union member-states and countries 
covered  by  the  Stabilisation  and  Association  Process,  24  November  2000,  at 
http://europa.eu.int/ 
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contractual relations with the Western Balkan countries have to be flexible 
and adapted to the specific conditions and needs of each individual country. 
The  Copenhagen  Council  in  December  2002  confirmed  the  European 
perspective of the five countries of the Western Balkans, and underlined the 
Union’s determination to support their efforts - as potential candidates - to 
move closer to the European Union. The European Commission has also 
stated  that  “countries  meeting  the  conditions  should  continue  to  be 
supported  in  a  tangible  way in  progressing  towards  Europe.”18 Effective 
conditionality, according to the Commission, needs to be “complemented by 
effective  support  and advice on  how to  make necessary reforms.”19 The 
Thessaloniki  Council,  held  in  June  2003,  encompassed  the  Second  EU-
Western Balkans Summit. On this occasion, the EU opened the Community 
programmes  to  the  SAp  countries  along  the  lines  established  for  the 
participation of CEE candidate countries.20 Declaring the EU’s aim to make 
the Balkans an integral part of a unified Europe, the Thessaloniki summit 
confirmed that the “regatta principle” would be applied in the examination 
of each individual country’s performance. This  confirmed that the EU still 
regarded  the  region  as  a  whole;  nevertheless  each  country  was  given  a 
chance  to  be rewarded individually  for  its  progress.  In  other  words,  the 
progress of each country would depend on the ability and political will to 
introduce  the  necessary reforms and to  implement  and respect  generally 
accepted rules and standards.  Acknowledging the individual component of 
the enlargement,  the countries of the region committed themselves at the 
Thessaloniki Summit to enhanced regional cooperation and the promotion 
of a series of specific objectives and initiatives. 
The individual modality of the SAp is executed through the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements (SAA) that were meant to be signed in due 
course between the EU and each of the Western Balkan countries. SAAs 
provide the possibility for each country of the region to move at its own 
pace  towards  meeting  the  demands  of  EU  integration.  The  political 
significance of the SAA lies in the fact that it grants to the signatory party 
potential  candidate status, thus offering the key to its EU accession. The 
Agreement is signed between a potential applicant state and the European 
Communities  that  are  represented  by  the  Commissioner  for  External 
Relations, together with the foreign ministers of all member states of the 
18 Report from the Commission. The Stabilisation and Association Process for South East 
Europe, Second Annual Report 2002, http://www.emins.org/
19 Ibid.
20 Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: moving towards European integration, 
Thessaloniki, 16 June 2003,  at http://europa.eu.int/
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EU.  The  SAA  is  seen  as  an  entry  strategy,  and  as  the  introduction  of 
European values, principles and standards to the associated country. 
The regional cooperation approach has been used for accession negotiations 
with CEE countries.21 Besides cooperation amongst states and their regions, 
the general idea behind the EU integration process is the “cohesion policy” 
pursued within the Union that  aspires  to overcome economic differences 
among the EU’s regions and countries.22 This policy is implemented through 
programmes that require cross-border cooperation among member states.23 
Naturally, Western Balkan countries could also benefit from drawing on the 
experience of the new member states and their transition and pre-accession 
preparations.  For  that  reason,  they  are  not  only  encouraged  to  increase 
cooperation within the region, but also with EU members.24 An example of 
regional cooperation, which could serve as a model for the Western Balkan 
countries, is the Visegrád group: an initiative that gathered four countries of 
the  Central  European  region  (the  Czech Republic,  Hungary,  Poland and 
Slovakia) with the common goal of cooperating in a number of fields of 
common interest for European integration.  The cooperation that emerged 
from the mutual  efforts  towards European integration identified not only 
this as a common goal, but also the similarity of transitional changes in all 
countries with a “traditional, historically shaped system of mutual contacts, 
cultural and spiritual heritage and common roots of religious traditions.”25 
All  four  countries  became  members  of  the  EU  on  1  May  2004,  but 
21 Kyriaki Topidi,  The Limits of EU Conditionality: Minority Rights in Slovakia (2003) 1 
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/
22 European Stability Initiative. The Road to Thessaloniki: Cohesion and the Western 
Balkans, http://www.esiweb.org/. See also Marjorie Jouen, James W. Scott et al.,  Is  
the  New  Europe  Inventing  Itself  in  its  Margins?  Cross-Border  and  Transnational  
Cooperation, Notre Europe (2001) http://www.cor.eu.int/  
23 Under  the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  several  initiatives  were  launched 
intending to strengthen economic and social cohesion throughout the EU. The Interreg III 
programme, for example, fosters balanced development through cross-border, transnational 
and  interregional  cooperation.  See  http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/interreg3/ 
index_en.htm.
24 See, for example, the Third Annual Report of the Stabilisation and Association Process 
for  South  East  Europe,  COM(2004)  202/2  final,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ 
relations/see/sap/rep3/strat_pap.pdf
25 Declaration on the cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal  Republic,  the 
Republic  of  Poland and the Republic  of  Hungary on the road to  European integration, 
http://www.visegradgroup.org/  
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nevertheless have declared their intention to maintain regional cooperation 
with each other.26
Uniform Conditions applied in Diverse Realities
Neoliberalism explains the expansion impetus of institutions by reason of 
the organisation’s  gain when expanding “its  principles,  norms,  rules  and 
decision-making procedures over  a  larger  set  of  states  in order  to better 
address specific issue-areas.”27 The EU enlargement in May 2004 stimulates 
the countries remaining at the EU’s doorstep. However, the Western Balkan 
countries did not start their approach towards the EU simultaneously: while 
Croatia28 and  Macedonia29 have  already  submitted  applications  for  EU 
membership, some countries in the region that still face security problems 
are far from making the application. Furthermore, nationalistic policies, one 
of the main concerns of the international community that slows down the 
integration of the Western Balkans, are not being removed equally quickly 
in all of the region’s countries. After the November 2003 election in Serbia, 
when the radical party obtained a relative majority, the High Representative 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that for Serbia "the pull of the myth of 
nationalism remains  stronger  than  the  pull  of  Europe."30 The  nationalist 
orientation of any country in the region would constitute an impediment for 
good neighbourly relations, and this could block regional cooperation.
In the following paragraphs, the individual approach of the EU towards each 
of the Western Balkan countries will be examined, and consideration given 
to whether the security situation has actual implications on enlargement. 
Croatia
26 Substantive elements of the agreement include cooperation in a wide range of issues, 
including cross-border cooperation. See the Contents of Visegrád cooperation approved by 
the Prime Ministers’ summit, Bratislava, 14 May, 1999, http://www.visegradgroup.org/  
27 Stephen Krasner (Ed.), INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1982) Ithaca: Cornell University Press
28 The Republic of Croatia was the first of the Western Balkans countries to submit an 
application for EU membership on 21 February 2003 and received EU candidate status in 
June 2004. 
29 Macedonia officially handed in  the application for EU membership on February 26, 
2004. 
30 Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina in an interview for 
the BBC, 15 February, 2004  
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Croatia is a country whose official policies no longer manifest nationalistic 
features and whose economy outperforms that all other Balkan countries. It 
has  made several  internal  legislative  amendments  required by the EU in 
order to achieve candidate status. Certain human and minority rights issues 
(such as  the  process  of  return of  refugees  of  ethnic Serb origin and the 
restitution of their property by the end of 2004) as well as cooperation with 
the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  Former  Yugoslavia  improved 
after the change of government in 2000. The current government, elected in 
2003, continues to meet the criteria for candidate status. This good record 
has been recognised and has encouraged negotiations for accession to the 
European Union.31 In fact, Croatia’s candidate status was endorsed at the 
European  Council  summit  in  June  2004.  It  is  hoped  that  the  Croatian 
success in approaching the accession negotiations will encourage the other 
Balkan countries to intensify their progress in fulfilling EU conditionality 
principles,  thus eventually  leading them to achieve candidate status.  The 
country  optimistically  aspired  to  join  the  EU  in  2007,  together  with 
Romania  and Bulgaria,  but  the  postponement  of  the  accession talks  has 
made this plan unlikely and the government at the moment proclaims that 
the country could become an EU member by 2009. The regional approach 
naturally  remains  an  essential  element  of  EU  policy  towards  the  new 
candidate state which was urged “to continue to make a strong contribution 
to the development of closer regional cooperation.”32 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The weak states33 of the Western Balkans have been stabilised through a 
number of internationally brokered peace agreements. In the same way, the 
current  (quasi-)stability  is  maintained  by  the  presence  of  international 
peacekeeping forces. The Dayton Peace Accords34 of November 1995 ended 
ethnic  conflicts  in  Croatia  and  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (hereinafter: 
31 The European Commission's Opinion on the Application of Croatia for Membership of 
the  European  Union,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sap/rep3/cr_croat. 
pdf
32 Presidency  Conclusions  of  the  European  Council,  Brussels,  17  and  18  June  2004, 
http://www.ue2004.ie/templates/document_ file.asp?id=19366, p. 8
33 A  weak state  is  defined as  one  with  inefficient  institutions  and  which  is  unable  or 
unwilling to enforce rules or to implement consistent policies. Weak states constitute the 
main obstacle  for  the necessary democratisation processes in the region.  See  Wim van 
Meurs (Ed.), see n. 6
34 The  General  Framework  Agreement  for  Peace  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
http://www.ohr.int/ 
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BiH), but the provisions of the peace agreement have kept BiH in a position 
of  a  quasi-protectorate,  governed  by  both  domestic  institutions  and  the 
international community.35 Eight years after the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accords, their provisions “prevent Bosnians from being citizens with equal 
rights  throughout  the  country,  favour  nationalist  parties,  and  make  self-
sustaining  peace  difficult  to  achieve",36 since  the  peace  agreement  “was 
designed to end the war in BiH, not to build the country.”37 The October 
2002  parliamentary  elections  re-established  the  power  of  the  three 
nationalist parties that governed the country during the 1992-1995 conflict, 
with Bosnia remaining sharply divided along the lines of two entities (the 
Serb  one  and  the  Croat-Bosniak  one).  In  reaction,  some  international 
organisations reduced or closed their  offices,  and,  even though domestic 
authorities have been finally encouraged to assume national ownership, a 
real withdrawal strategy does not yet exist.38 The idea that has been present 
in public debates in BiH for some years now advocates that decisions on 
BiH's  distribution  of  power  and  resources  should  not  be  made  by  the 
international community, but by the country's political elite. Some suggest 
35 All major international organisations participated in a post-war reconstruction and state 
building  processes  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The Office  of  the  High  Representative 
mission is to oversee implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. The 
European Union is represented through the European Commission’s Delegation to BiH and 
the  European  Union  Police  Mission  (EUMP).  The  OSCE Mission  to  BiH is  primarily 
engaged  in  education,  democratisation  and  human  rights.  The  Commission  for  Real 
Property Claims (CRPC) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) representation in BiH 
deal with the restitution of property and the return of refugees respectively. The Council of 
Europe (CoE) office in  BiH mostly  assists  in  legal  reform and in  the  improvement of 
freedom of expression and the media. Other international organs present in BiH are the 
United  Nations  Development  Program (UNDP),  the  World  Bank and  the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) Mission’s mandate is to provide a 
safe  and secure environment  in  Bosnia  and Herzegovina.  The only organisation whose 
mandate has ended is the United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). 
It was set up in 1995 to deal with law enforcement activities and police reform, and was 
ended on 31 December 2002.
36 United States Institute of Peace Report, Bosnia's Next Five Years: Dayton and Beyond, 
http://www.usip.org/ See also ESI Report, Making Federalism Work - A Radical Proposal  
For Practical Reform, http://www.esiweb.org/ 
37 Adrian Pop, Security: from Powder Keg to Cooperation, in Wim van Meurs (Ed.), see n. 
6 (p. 121)
38 A recent  joint  declaration signed by all  the parties represented in the BiH House of 
Representatives pledging their readiness to find consensus in order to achieve membership 
of the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace offers some hope that Bosnian 
politicians are more willing to take greater initiative in governing their country. See press 
release at the site of the High Representative, 18 February, 2004, http://www.ohr.int/
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that in order to undertake necessary reforms, BiH should become a federal 
state comprising twelve federal units.39
Serbia and Montenegro
The EU played an active role in the creation of a looser federation between 
Serbia and Montenegro (hereinafter: SiM) in February 2003, determined to 
block Montenegrin independence and keep the two republics together.40 The 
population  of  Montenegro  is  sharply  divided  between  those  who  back 
independence,  and  those  in  favour  of  union  with  Serbia.  Serbia  is 
economically  as  well  as  politically  far  from fulfilling  the  conditions  for 
accession.  However,  the  political  leaders  of  both  republics  promote  EU 
membership and good relations with the other Balkan countries as political 
priorities. An example of the efforts successfully concluded is the resolution 
of  the  dispute  between  Croatia  and  SiM  for  the  Prevlaka  peninsula,  a 
strategic area at the southernmost tip of Croatian territory. Furthermore, the 
abolition of visa requirements, the conclusion of a free trade agreement and 
the mutual payment of pensions were agreed upon by the two neighbouring 
countries. These and other achievements were fully acknowledged by the 
international community, and were eventually evaluated as an asset in the 
case of Croatia’s application for EU membership.
Nevertheless, no matter how strong the economy of Serbia and Montenegro 
might become, it is hardly, if at all, conceivable that Serbia could join the 
EU  without  having  solved  the  Kosovo  problem.  Kosovo,  sometimes 
described as “the time bomb ticking under the Balkan body politics”41 with 
its blurred and undefined status, constitutes a Gordian knot, not only for the 
accession of SiM into the EU but also for the whole Balkan region.42 Apart 
from  the  status  quo,  which  implies  the  long-lasting  presence  of  the 
international community, there are three possible political solutions to this 
problem:  the first would be to include Kosovo as a federated unit in the 
new  federal  union;  the  second  would  be  the  union  of  the  Province  of 
Kosovo  with  Albania,  advocated  by  a  minority  of  ethnic  Albanians  in 
39 See,  for  example,  the  report  prepared  by  the  European  Stability  Initiative:  Making 
Federalism Work - A Radical Proposal for Practical Reform, http://www.esiweb.org/
40 International Crisis Group (ICG) Report, Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the  
European Union, http://www.reliefweb.int/
41 Laura  Silber,  Bush Has Neglected the Balkans For Too Long.  A ticking time bomb. 
Article in the International Herald Tribune, January 13, 2004
42 Ylber Hysa,  Kosovo: A Fragile Agenda of Democratization. In Wim van Meurs (Ed.), 
see n. 6 (p. 213-225)
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Kosovo;43 and  the  third  would  be  to  grant  the  status  of  independence, 
recognising the right to self-determination of the Albanian community in 
Kosovo. The last mentioned scenario would have no precedent in the recent 
history  of  SEE,  since  the  principle  of  integrity  of  previously  existing 
internal borders within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would 
be  infringed. In  addition  to  this,  Macedonia,  a  neighbouring state  to  the 
Kosovo province, is determined not to recognise an independent Kosovo; it 
fears that it could stir up the secessionist claims of the Albanian minority 
that makes up one quarter of Macedonia’s population. 
The role of the international community will be crucial in finding the final 
status  for  the  Province  of  Kosovo,  and  it  should  do  so  by  taking  into 
consideration  how  the  decision  will  affect  neighbouring  countries.  The 
preparation of the Kosovo protectorate for European integration is among 
the priorities of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which administers the province. In spite of its 
engagements in Kosovo in the post-crisis reconstruction process, it seems 
that the EU and the greater international community still lack a clear vision 
for the future of the territory. Certain scholars envisaged that the resolution 
of Kosovo’s status and that of the Balkans in general should be conceded to 
the EU, since neither  the United Nations nor the United States treat  the 
Balkans as one of their priorities.44 Following a violent upheaval in March 
2004, it became apparent that a search for a solution regarding the status of 
Kosovo  will  be  even  more  difficult  than  first  believed.  Although  it  is 
generally  considered that  resolving  Kosovo's  status  would  accelerate  the 
region’s integration into the EU, the Belgrade-Pristina direct dialogue is still 
in a very fragile phase. The document “Standards for Kosovo” launched in 
December 2003 by the international community foresees actions that have 
to  be  undertaken  by  the  province's  Provisional  Institutions  of  Self-
Government (PISG)45 in order to decide upon the permanent future status of 
43 ICG Report,  Pan-Albanianism:  How Big a  Threat  to  Balkan Stability?,  http://www. 
crisisweb.org/, p. 14
44 Dusan Janjic, The Present Status of Kosovo Cannot Last Longer Than 2005, New Balkan 
Politics  Journal,  http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/,  and  Dieter  Mahncke  (Ed.),  Old 
Frontiers - New Frontiers, The Challenge of Kosovo and its Implications for the European 
Union, http://www.euintegration.net/
45 The  PISG  comprise  the  Assembly,  the  President,  the  Government  containing  ten 
ministries, and the court system, while the UNMIK retains exclusive powers in the rule of 
law, security and property issues. See ICG Report, Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New 
Kosovo SRSG (2003) http://www.crisisweb.org/   
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Kosovo.46 This document makes,  inter alia,  engagement in direct talks a 
precondition for the opening of the discussions for Kosovo’s final status. 
Nonetheless,  the  UNMIK  has  received  declarations  that  both  parties 
involved in negotiations do back regional cooperation. It is expected that 
talks on the final status solution should start in 2005. 
Macedonia
Even though it was the first country of the region to sign the SAp in 2000, 
Macedonia submitted its membership application only on March 22, 2004. 
The government had already presented a national programme for adjusting 
national legislation to the acquis, and strategies for a reform of the judiciary 
and the police were launched to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. The Ohrid 
peace  agreement,47 signed  on  13  August  2001,  ended  seven  months  of 
fighting  between  the  ethnic  Albanian  rebels  of  the  National  Liberation 
Army  (UCK)  and  Macedonian  government  forces  in  Macedonia.  The 
prompt  intervention  of  the  international  community  in  this  case  made 
unlikely  “a  repetition  of  the  scenario  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina”.48 
Macedonian authorities have been warned that “[t]he only road to Brussels 
runs through Ohrid”,49 meaning that the implementation of the Ohrid peace 
agreement is the most important precondition for closer relations between 
the  country  and  the  EU.  Consequently,  the  government  decided  on  16 
December 2003 to undertake a concrete action plan for the implementation 
of the Agreement. 
Albania
Albania  is  the  poorest  country  in  the  region,  and  among  the  least 
economically  developed  European  country.  Even  though  it  did  not 
experience  ethnic  turmoil  in  the  1990s  it  depends  on  foreign  financial 
support.  The  Country  Strategy  Paper  for  Albania  recommends  certain 
institutional, political and economic reforms that the country will have to 
46 The measures should improve the functioning of democratic institutions, the rule of law, 
the  freedom of  movement,  return  and  reintegration,  the  enhancement  of  the  economy, 
repossession of property rights, and dialogue with Belgrade. Eventually, fulfilment of these 
measures would decide whether the province is ready for talks on its future status after a 
review of the progress in the targets' implementation by mid-2005.
47 Framework  Agreement  concluded  in  Skopje  on  13  August  2001, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/ 
48 see n. 37, p. 123
49 Interview with Javier Solana in "Dnevnik" of 7 February 2004, http://ue.eu.int/ 
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undertake in order to qualify for EU membership.50 In January 2004 the 
negotiations for a SAA between the EU and Albania were launched. The 
security threats that might endanger the stability of the Western Balkans in 
the  case  of  Albania  are  incorporated  in  the  political  groups  present  in 
Kosovo and Albania which advocate the constitution of a greater Albania, 
annexing the territory of the Province of Kosovo and parts of Macedonia to 
Albania.51 In order to please Brussels, the Albanian president Alfred Moisiu 
declared that the country supports direct talks between Pristina and Belgrade 
in finding a solution for the status of Kosovo and promotes cooperation and 
stability in the region.52 Albanian political representatives took part in the 
unsuccessful first round of negotiations over the status of Kosovo held in 
Vienna  in  October  2003.  It  is  not  very  likely  that  the  official  Albanian 
position  in  the  negotiations  would  openly  advocate  independence  for 
Kosovo.
The Other Neighbouring Countries
Two candidate countries neighbouring the Western Balkans, Bulgaria and 
Romania,  have  achieved  neither  sufficient  economic  progress  nor  a 
functioning  market  economy,  which  are  the  key  preconditions  for  EU 
membership. Consequently,  they remained outside the recent enlargement 
wave.53 However, the Commissioner for Enlargement,  Günter Verheugen, 
stated  that  considerable  progress  has  been  made  in  the  accession 
negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania and referred to the whole process 
encouragingly, describing their accession to the EU in 2007 as "realistic".54 
Romania began official accession talks in February 2000 and has not yet 
closed all of the 30 chapters of negotiation, while Bulgaria, which started 
the accession negotiations in March 2000, has already done so. Bulgaria is 
technically ready for accession in 2007, but the Commission might postpone 
it for one year if the already adopted reforms are not properly implemented. 
Even though both countries hope to be ready to join the EU in 2007, they 
accuse each other for the slow accession progress. Bulgaria, which is doing 
better  economically,  is  particularly  prone  to  make  accusations  that  it  is 
50 Community Strategy Paper for Albania, 2002-2006, http://www.europa.eu.int/
51 International Crisis Group (ICG) Report, Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan 
Stability?, http://www.crisisweb.org/,  p. 14.
52 Southeast European Times, 18 February 2004, http://www.balkantimes.com/
53 The European Commission’s Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession, 
and the European Commission’s Regular Report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession, 
5 November 2003, http://europa.ed.int/ 
54 Ibid.
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being dragged down by Romania’s  slow implementation of the  acquis.55 
Regardless of the disputes and mutual  accusations,  the countries’ leaders 
realise that the only way to the EU is through cooperation, not only between 
themselves but also with the broader region. Taking this into consideration, 
Bulgaria's  Foreign  Minister  has  stated  that  “[a]n  eventual  suspension  of 
Romania's [accession] talks would trigger a delay in the EU integration of 
the whole Balkan region.”56 
Is there an Alternative to Regional Cooperation?
According  to  liberal  internationalism  -  which  finds  in  the  EU  itself  a 
textbook  example  of  inter-state  cooperation  -  a  transnational  economic 
society of free commerce and industry links people across borders and thus 
enhances state interests in cooperation and peace.57 Regional cooperation is 
an integral part of the preparation for integration into European structures.58 
The EU insists on improved relations between countries that were recent 
enemies,  not  only  because  it  encourages  and  applauds  economic 
development, but also as a guarantee of stability and security. 
Even though the EU has often been criticised for insufficient engagement in 
the resolution of the conflicts that took place in the Western Balkans and the 
lack  of  a  clear  perspective  regarding  the  membership  of  the  Western 
Balkans region, the Union’s efforts to contribute to the development of the 
Balkan  region  must  be  acknowledged.59 The  EU  in  practice  uses  the 
prospect  of  integration  as  part  of  the  “carrot  and  stick”  method  in 
conditioning  financial  aid  for  Western  Balkan’s  stabilisation  and 
development. The EU employs the argument of necessary compliance with 
EU standards whenever it wishes to foster local support for the government 
on issues that might be difficult to justify to the local electorate. At the same 
time,  the  EU  expects  all  Western  Balkan  governments  to  upgrade  their 
55 Viktor D. Bojkov,  Disassociation through Integration – the Case of Bulgaria and EU 
Enlargement (2003) 1 Novi Pogledi p. 17-19
56 Article  in  the  Bulgarian  magazine  “Novine”,  Bulgaria  Throws  Embattled  Romania 
Lifeline en Route to EU, 14 February 2004, http://www.novinite.com/ 
57 See Stanley Hoffmann,  The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism  (1995) Foreign Policy, 
Spencer R. Weart, NEVER AT WAR: WHY DEMOCRACIES WILL NOT FIGHT ONE ANOTHER  (1998) 
New Haven: Yale University Press
58 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The 
Western  Balkans  and  European  Integration,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ 
relations/see/2003.pdf
59 See n.15, p. 16.  Sophia Clement, for example, claims that “Kosovo demonstrated the 
long-term economic, political and military consequences of the failure to address a crisis 
preventively”. See Sophia Clement, n.3 
16
institutions and governance to European standards and to engage in mutual 
cooperation. Financial  assistance  for  various  economic  and  development 
programmes is often conditioned by the country’s willingness to enter into 
bilateral relations with the five countries of the region. This is justifiable, 
since  the  regional  cooperation  introduced  in  SAp  was  based  on  the 
European  Union  model  of  integration  and  cooperation.  The  CARDS 
programme assists regional authorities in gearing up to the reforms required 
by the EU with € 197 million in the period 2002 - 2004.60 
The individual component of the EU policy underlines that each country’s 
contribution  to  achieving  regional  objectives  will  help  to  determine  its 
readiness to take on the demands of full integration into the EU. However, 
the individual approach has been criticised by some scholars. Condemning 
the  insufficient  requirements  for  regional  cooperation  within  the 
Stabilisation and Association agreements, they promote the idea that the EU 
should consider the region as a whole.61 Advocates for regional cooperation 
stress  that  the  Western  Balkans’  “economic  geography  and  specific 
historical  legacies  have  important  consequences  for  patterns  of 
development, and that structural causes of underdevelopment can determine 
the fate of entire regions, be they old industrial centres or peripheral rural 
areas”.62 Explaining that regional cooperation is very often “the outcome of 
the  interplay  between  external/international  factors  and  internal 
dynamics,”63 Vesna Bojičić-Dželilovic and Othon Anastasakis argue that the 
international  community  has  achieved  insufficient  results  by  way  of 
pursuing  regional  strategies  “which  are  not  always  consistent”,64 mostly 
because  the  process  of  regional  cooperation was  imposed,  and the  local 
actors/elites  were  not  properly  included.  Those  scholars  claim that  it  is 
crucial to have the support of the local elite since “the decision to engage in 
regional  cooperation  in  a  constructive  manner  ultimately  rests  on  the 
willingness of the local elites to identify common and mutual interests and, 
60 The main areas of intervention funded by CARDS are the promotion of integrated border 
management,  the  promotion  of  democratic  stabilisation,  institution  building,  the 
development of regional infrastructure approaches, work in the field of higher education 
and vocational training (TEMPUS), SIGMA and Twinning.
61 See United States Institute for Peace Special Report No. 54, De-Balkanizing the Balkans.  
Security and Stability in Southeastern Europe, http://www.usip.org/ 





with outside help, translate them into workable initiatives with practical and 
beneficial results.”65 
For a long time, the Croatian political establishment feared that insistence 
on regional cooperation might set the country back into new state structures 
in the Balkans. Perhaps for that reason the government has been insisting on 
giving equal weight to regional cooperation and individual performances in 
the country’s approach towards the EU. The former Minister for European 
Integration claimed, for example, that “coordinated regional initiatives are 
welcome,  but  an  individual  approach  to  the  EU  is  a  must.”66 Croatian 
President  Stipe  Mesić  stated  that  “progress  in  regional  cooperation 
represents one of the criteria in play for assessing the speed of convergence 
of individual countries with the European Union, but Croatia does not want 
to be a prisoner of the region” 67 nor wants “regional cooperation to become 
an end in itself.”68 A previous Croatian minister of foreign affairs, Miomir 
Žužul, bore witness to the country’s commitment to regional cooperation in 
his  address  to  the  Permanent  Council  of  the  OSCE  in  February  2004, 
claiming that  Croatia’s objective is  “to maintain and strengthen relations 
with […] neighbouring countries and within the wider region.”69
Nevertheless,  regional  integration  has  much  less  political  support 
throughout the region than integration into the European Union. At the same 
time, intra-regional trade remains low, at about 6% of the total trade of all 
five countries.70 Balkan economists tend to underestimate the importance of 
intra-regional trade, arguing that neighbouring countries are too poor to be 
of  interest  for  investment  or  that  neighbours  constitute  economic 
competition.  Discrepancies in the economies of the Western Balkans are 
indeed severe. Croatia is the largest economy with a GDP of some € 23 
billion, accounting alone for nearly half of the region’s GDP; the average 
65 Ibid.
66 Neven Mimica at the conference "Forum for European Integration", Skopje, Macedonia, 
15-16 March 2003, http://www.esiweb.org/
67 Lecture of Stipe Mesic at Charles University, Czech Republic: Croatia - One Year After.  
There is no alternative to democracy and Europe, http://certik.ruk.cuni.cz/ 
68 Ibid. 
69 Address by Dr. Miomir Žužul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, at 
the  495th  meeting  of  the  OSCE  Special  Permanent  Council,  16  February  2004, 
http://www.osce.org/ 
70 See  the  European  Commission's  Second  Annual  Report,  The  Stabilisation  and 
Association Process for South East Europe, 2003, http://www.emins.org/
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per capita income is approximately € 5100 in Croatia, while the average of 
all the other countries is about € 1350.71 
Višnja  Samardžija  and  Will  Bartlett  predict  faster  liberalisation  in  trade 
between the individual countries and the EU than between the countries in 
the  region.72 Contrary  to  current  practice,  Liz  Barrett  advocates  intra-
regional trade, and more particularly the creation of a Balkan single-market. 
Barrett highlights business as the driving force for a single market in the 
Balkans, claiming that cross-border business links would enhance economic 
gains  “through  higher  levels  of  entrepreneurial  activity  and  increased 
foreign investment”.73 Trade integration of Western Balkan countries both 
with the EU and within the region itself has improved through the network 
of free trade agreements signed between the countries of the region under 
the auspices of the Stability Pact’s working group on trade liberalisation. It 
is  expected  that  those  free  trade  agreements  will  not  only  boost  intra-
regional trade, but also enhance production and increase competition. 
The 2004 Annual Report of the SAp defines regional cooperation as “the 
natural  way  to  tackle  shared  problems  and  to  make  further  progress  in 
important sectors”.74 It endorses regional cooperation as an issue that goes 
hand in hand with the further development of the individual countries. The 
report indicates the common challenges that the Western Balkan countries 
face: the return of refugees, infrastructure and economic development and 
the fight against organised crime underlying the cross-border dimensions of 
the given issues.  Sharing a similar history and facing similar  transitional 
problems,  the  Western  Balkans  could  benefit  from  an  exchange  of 
knowledge, new practices and skills achieved in the neighbouring countries.
71 The  population  of  the  Western  Balkans  region  is  about  25  million  people,  and  its 
economic  size  (GDP)  is  equivalent  to  some  €50  billion.  See  Developing  Regional  
Cooperation,  http://www.emins.org/dokumenti/stabilisation-see.pdf.  The  World  Bank’s 
report reads that the GDP of SEE (also including, apart from the countries under study in 
this paper, Romania and Bulgaria) is $2,200 per capita, roughly half the income level of the 
five Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia), The World Bank Report, The road to stability and prosperity in South-Eastern  
Europe (2000) http://www.worldbank.org/
72 Višnja Samardžija, Will Bartlett, The Reconstruction of South East Europe, the Stability  
Pact and the Role of the EU: an Overview (2000) 2 MOCT-MOST p. 245-263
73 Liz  Barrett,  Business  in  the  Balkans:  The  case  for  cross-border  cooperation, CER 
working paper (2002) http://www.cer.org.uk/ 
74 The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe, Third Annual Report 
(COM(2004)  202  /2  final),  Brussels,  30.3.2004,  http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ 
relations/see/sap/rep3/strat_pap.pdf
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The modernisation theory in developmental science puts forward economic 
and political developments as factors that promote the integration of ethnic 
groups in post-conflict societies.75 The promotion and strengthening of good 
neighbourly relations in the Balkans are demonstrated in both economic and 
political fields. Political measures that contribute to regional networking in 
South  East  Europe  include  the  abolishment  of  the  visa  system,  the 
accommodation of minorities and the commitment to regional cooperation 
among Croatia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  Serbia  and  Montenegro  in 
resolving the issue of return of refugees and repossession of property. The 
Western Balkan is perceived as a region with porous borders and a gateway 
for criminal activities, illegal immigration, organised crime and, possibly, 
terrorist actions.76 For that reason, the EU insists upon law enforcement in 
the  countries  of  the  region,  promoting  cooperation  in  justice  and  home 
affairs, and making clear that regional political and institutional cooperation 
will  improve  the  prospect  of  closer  integration  into  the  EU. The 
enhancement of economical regional cooperation in inter-state transport and 
trade integration, as well as compliance with the economic criteria of the 
EU, lay the foundations for economies to be able to catch up with the strong 
economies of the EU member states. Indeed, the business sector has made 
the  first  move  towards  the  reestablishment  of  connections  among  the 
countries of the region. One example is Kosovo: “political dialogue between 
Serbs and Albanians remains stalled, trade between the two is booming”.77 
75 The  modernisation  theory,  together  with  the  neoliberal  theory,  belongs  to  the  neo-
classical theories of economic growth in the broader paradigms of development. Advocates 
of  the  modernisation  theory  assume  that  a  linear  process  exists  whereby  developing 
countries  progressively  become  industrialised.  They  furthermore  consider  that  the 
industrialising  experience  of  rich  countries  should  serve  as  a  good  example  for  the 
developing ones. The rich countries have, according to the proponents of the theory, been 
successful  in  implementing  the  concept  of  modernity,  which  brings  the  blessings  of 
progress in every sphere of human life. The main opponents to both modernisation theories 
and the neoliberal approach make the criticism that those theories fail to focus on the social 
and cultural needs inherent to development, and only look towards economic solutions. See 
W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953. 
Samuel  P.  Huntington,  Political  Order  in  Changing  Societies, New  Haven,  CT:  Yale 
University Press, 1968. Thomas D. Lairson and David Skidmore,  International Political  
Economy:  The  Struggles  for  Power  and  Wealth, New  York:  Harcourt  Brace  College 
Publishers,  1993.  Ronald  Inglehart,  Modernization  and  Postmodernization:   Cultural,  
Economic,  and Political  Change in  43 Societies, Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
1997.
76 On corruption and organised crime in South East Europe, see n. 37, p. 124-129
77 Tanja Matić,  Altin  Ahmeti,  Kosovo:  Trade Booms Between old Enemies  (2004) 479 
IWPR's Balkan Crisis Report, http://www.iwpr.net/
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Therefore, it seems that regional cooperation among the Western Balkans is 
a necessity that actually provides for mutual benefits. A country that opts 
for the other solution inevitably heads into economic and political isolation. 
Conclusion
The short-term goal of the EU for the Western Balkans was the stabilisation 
of the region and the prevention of new conflicts. The subsequent goal was 
to foster the development of economic, political and cultural ties within the 
region. Assuming that the EU will eventually integrate the Western Balkans, 
one of the hypotheses of this paper is that accession to the European Union 
will  safeguard peace and stability,  not only in the region but also in the 
European continent. 
Stronger  regional  cooperation increases  the prospects  for  the more  rapid 
integration of the region into the EU. Some feared that regional cooperation 
would  be  a  trap  to  keep  the  countries  of  the  Western  Balkans  together 
without  giving  them  the  chance  to  prove  their  progress  individually. 
However,  this  proved  to  be  false  when  Croatia  succeeded  in  gaining 
candidate status in June 2004. Nevertheless, the issue of support from the 
local elites for regional cooperation remains crucial, since they are the ones 
responsible for the implementation of the EU’s conditionality policies.
The  governing  political  establishments  of  the  Western  Balkan  states 
consider that the only fair approach towards eventual EU enlargement is a 
fully  flexible,  multi-speed accession process, known also  as  the  “regatta 
principle”. It allows each of the Western Balkan countries to proceed at its 
own pace and to be assessed on its own merits. Countries will join when 
they are  able  to meet  all  the obligations inherent  to membership  and to 
accept compliance with the common European values and standards, as well 
as the acquis communautaire. For that reason, each country is motivated to 
accelerate  necessary  reforms.  Highlighting  the  implications  of  Croatia's 
candidate status for other countries of the Western Balkans, the European 
Council  emphasised  that  the  advance  of  the  individual  countries  of  the 
region  towards  European  integration  will  proceed  in  parallel  with  the 
regional approach, which remains an essential element of EU policy. Even 
though the individual approach is not inconsistent with the development of 
regional  cooperation,  it  might  be  seen  as  an  impediment  to  good 
neighbourly relations. Namely, by advocating an assessment of individual 
achievement,  the  individual  approach promotes  competition  in  economic 
and other areas. The individual approach also allows for the possibility that 
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some countries might outperform others. However, for the time being it is 
hard to imagine that one of the Western Balkan countries could speed up in 
the accession process to such an extent that it would outrun Romania and 
Bulgaria. Finally, the argument in favour of an individual approach towards 
the Western Balkan countries might be found in the “contagion” effect of 
the neighbour’s accession to the EU. The effects of the potential acceptance 
of one of the Western Balkan countries would probably be positive in the 
administrative, judicial and police sectors of its neighbouring countries, and 
hence consolidate the rule of law and the capacity of the state institutions in 
the whole region.
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